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Abstract
In the market for corporate control, the ownership and control of firms is traded. 
Mergers and acquisitions are major events for firms affecting the continuity and 
performance of firms and industries. This paper studies the determinants of 
takeovers in the Netherlands over a long period, 1961–2008. We conclude that until 
the mid-1980s targets had low leverage and high cash holdings. After this period, 
shareholder wealth maximization became a dominant goal, and we find that smaller 
and more profitable firms become targets for takeovers. In the most recent period 
takeover defences shield firms from takeover, while this effect is not found in the 
early period until the mid-1980s. We demonstrate shareholder rights have become 
important in determining takeover probabilities. The results illustrate the efficacy of 
rules and regulations and how they can effect the market for corporate control in the 
Netherlands.
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1 Introduction
The key difference between private and publicly listed firms is that the latter 
group have shares trading at stock exchanges. This allows any investor to buy 
a significant portion of a firm’s shares with which they can exert managerial 
control. While private firms are shielded from the market for corporate 
control, public firms are vulnerable to takeovers and acquisitions. Some argue that 
this market is a positive force, because it disciplines poorly performing firms to 
improve their performance and allows synergies to be generated in optimal business 
combinations (Manne 1965). Others would refute this claim and argue that 
acquisitions in practice are often value-destroying because they are the outcome 
of—rather than a solution to—principal-agent problems (Jensen 1986; Moeller 
et al. 2005). In order to describe the market for corporate control it is relevant to 
understand which firms are takeover targets, because this reveals the motives of 
acquiring firms in corporate takeovers. Additionally, it is important to understand 
how managers are able to frustrate the market for corporate control and how the 
instruments at their disposal (i.e. takeover defences) affect takeover probabilities.
In the wider corporate finance literature there is longstanding tradition of 
studies that predict takeover targets. The first study of this genre is probably 
Simkowitz and Monroe (1971), using multiple discriminant analysis to predict 
takeover targets. However, the seminal paper in the field is Palepu (1986) because 
heintroduced binomial logit modelling. More recent studies are Cremers et  al. 
(2009) and Shafer (2012), both of which investigate the US market for corporate 
control. Also outside the US empirical results are available, among others for 
Canada (Rege 1984), the UK (Gaganis et  al. 2009; Danbolt et  al. 2016), and 
multiple European countries (Brar et  al. 2009). However, we are unaware of a 
study of the Dutch market for corporate control.
The Netherlands offers an interesting setting to study takeovers and acquisitions 
because Dutch firms are internationally known for the anti-takeover measures that 
shield managers of from the market for corporate control (De Jong et al. 2010). 
In an international comparison, the Dutch defence measures are unique because 
these legal barriers directly influence the opportunities for hostile acquirers 
(Adams and Ferreira 2008), where in other countries structural barriers prevail, 
such as cross-holdings and pyramidal ownership. It is interesting to measure 
whether the Dutch legal takeover barriers are effective in deterring unwanted 
takeover attempts.
This paper studies determinants of takeovers in the Netherlands over a long 
period of almost five decades, i.e. 1961–2008. In this period we find 200 successful 
takeovers. Although we also search for unsuccessful attempts, we find only fourteen 
 in our sample, which is insufficient for testing the correlates of failed takeover 
attempts. We divide our long period in two subperiods, until 1985 and from 
1986 onwards. The main reason for this division is that 1985 is a watershed in 
Dutch corporate governance, in this year the Amsterdam stock exchange started a 
discussion about takeover defences in their annual report, which induced a more 
negative perspective among stakeholder on these defences. Until the mid-1980, 
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Dutch firms were typically owned by national institutional investors and large 
domestic shareholders. During this period, the Dutch economy operated as a 
coordinated market economy, where managers of large firms acted in the interest 
 of all stakeholders. From the mid-1980 international influences—in particular from 
the US—brought shareholder wealth maximization as a competing perspective. 
The Dutch economy moved to a more liberal system (see Sluyterman 2005; 
Westerhuis and De Jong 2015).
We use discrete choice models predicting firm-year observations in which a 
successful takeover is found, using variables that capture general theories of takeovers, 
including inefficient management, a growth-resource mismatch, and undervaluation. 
In additional we control for takeover waves and include takeover defences and ownership 
information. All models are tested for the full period and for both subperiods. We 
find that the characteristics of takeover target differ between the two periods we 
distinguish. Until the mid-1980s targets had high cash holdings, which is an 
indication of inefficient management and growth-resource matching, because acquirers 
took over the cash-rich firm to better spend that cash. In the same period low leverage firms 
became targets. This is also indicative of inefficient management. This is because 
low leverage allows for additional use of the tax benefits of debt, but also that these 
firms lack the disciplining role of debt (Jensen 1986). Interestingly, anti-takeover 
measures do not play any role in the process, which is consistent with a cooperative 
model, where managers of two firms would have to agree on friendly mergers in the 
interest of all stakeholders.
Shareholder wealth maximization became a dominant goal in the years after 
1985. We find that the market for corporate control changed significantly. Most 
importantly, firms that are less protected by takeover defences are more likely to 
be targeted successfully. The flipside of this result—takeover defences deter 
takeovers—is an important result because of the heated debates on the relevance of 
takeover defences in the Dutch corporate landscape (Westerhuis and De Jong 2015). 
The finding is also consistent with previous results that firms with takeover defences 
have lower market values (De Jong et  al. 2005) and with negative announcement 
returns when the preferred shares are deployed as a takeover defence (Kabir et  al. 
1997). In addition we find in the second period evidence of growth-resource 
mismatching as smaller and more profitable firms become targets. Apparently, small 
and highly profitable firms with insufficient resources to growth organically can opt 
for a takeover by a larger and cash-rich firm to continue their growth.
Our analysis documents a significant shift in the logic of the Dutch market for 
corporate control in the wake of the shareholder revolution of the mid-1980s. Overall, 
we conclude the change from a coordinated market economy to a more liberal 
system, where shareholder value maximization became the first priority has significantly 
affected the market for corporate control. Not only did the determinants of successful 
takeover targets change, but so did the importance of the legal takeover defences, 
which are unique to the Dutch institutional setting.
In our view, the results of this study are relevant to Dutch researchers interested 
in mergers and acquisitions, but also in the longer term developments of the Dutch 
corporate governance system. In addition, Dutch policymakers can benefit from the 
insights of this study when regulating the market for takeovers and designing new 
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governance codes. We demonstrate shareholder rights matter in takeovers, but also 
that the evolution towards shareholder primacy has influenced practices, and thus 
the efficiency of rules and regulation. Finally, we consider our study to be relevant 
for an international audience, because different institutional settings yield variations 
in takeover dynamics. Therefore, understanding a larger variety in capitalist settings 
adds to our understanding of takeover motives.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we discuss the relevant literature. 
Section 3 describes the Dutch institutional setting. In Sect. 4 we introduce the data 
and our empirical methods. Section 5 presents the results and robustness tests and 
Sect. 6 concludes.
2  Literature Review
The takeover or acquisition of a publicly listed firm is a major event, both for the 
target and the acquirer. It has been widely documented that the target typically realizes 
a large positive return, while acquirers exhibit small, often negative, announcement 
returns (Moeller et al. 2005). This asymmetry stems from the premium the acquiring 
firm needs to pay to convince target shareholders to sell their shares. Because of 
this premium, it is attractive for investors to develop models to predict takeover 
targets. However, in addition to this investment or speculative perspective, models 
to distinguish target and non-target firms are informative about the motives for firms 
to engage in acquisitions and thus about the market for corporate control (Manne 
1965). In this section we describe motives for acquisition, from an acquirer and 
target viewpoint and we introduce methods for predicting targets and estimation of 
the determinants of acquisitions.
The first category of theories for acquisitions is inefficient management. In this 
perspective management teams are competing for the control over companies and an 
efficient outcome arises when the best management team gains control (Jensen and 
Ruback 1983). Inefficiently run companies are taken over by an acquiring firm that 
replaces the management and removes inefficiencies. Characteristics of inefficient 
firms include are low performance (i.e. low profitability), and low market valuations 
relative to book values. In addition high cash reserves and low leverage are a sign of 
inefficient use of cash and suboptimal usage of the tax advantages of debt (Modigliani 
and Miller 1963). Management can protect themselves against these disciplining 
takeovers by adopting anti-takeover devices and maintaining good relations with a 
large shareholders. Meanwhile, institutional investors may be more inclined to assist 
in a disciplining takeover. We focus on target firm characteristics because Jensen 
(1986) argues acquisitions can be an outcome of overinvestment; firms with weak 
governance acquire other firms to build corporate empires, because managers derive 
benefits from managing firms that are as large as possible.
A second group of motives are derived from growth-resource mismatch or synergy 
theories (Palepu 1986; Damodaran 2005). In this line of reasoning, after a merger the 
newly combined firm is worth more than the sum of its parts. Typically the merger 
involves a larger firm that is well-resourced in financial terms of cash, debt capacity, 
and in its ability to produce on a larger scale(i.e. utilize distribution networks) 
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and a smaller, young firm with sufficient opportunities for growth but lacking the 
financial resources. As we focus on target characteristics, we expect these firms to be the 
profitable and highly valued firms, which are small in size and strapped of cash and 
debt capacity. Firms can improve the attractiveness for a takeover by depreciating 
their assets to lower values. Also, rival firms often take toeholds in attractive targets 
and we therefore expect industrial firm shareholdings to induce takeovers.
The third set of motives are labelled undervaluation. Due to the information 
differences between insiders and outsiders to the firm, the full value of the firm 
may not be reflected in its share values. In case the management cannot convince 
outside shareholders of the value of the firm, the share price will be low relative 
to the replacement value of the firm’s assets (Palepu 1986). In this case, it will 
be cheap to buy the shares relative to the asset value, to gain control. We expect 
this motive to prevail in smaller firms with intangible assets. Most importantly, 
undervaluation is measured directly as a low market-to-book value.
Another motivation why managers target and acquire other companies is market 
sentiment. That is, when equity markets are overvalued, managers are more 
likely to overestimate the potential synergies even though they can see that 
their own stock price is affected by the same overvaluation (Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan 2004). While seemingly irrational, this behaviour can be fully 
explained by a rational model of (stock) mergers. In this setting, where managers 
of the bidding firm and the managers of the target firm have private information of 
their own firms, mispricing upon the closing of the deal has two components. First, a 
firm specific component (i.e. one for the bidder and one for the target), and, second, 
a market-wide component. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) argue that in 
equilibrium stock bids reflect the expected level of synergies. However, as 
they argue, the target has limited information about the two components of the 
mis-valuation, and is unable to assess the potential synergies. More explicitly, the 
target managers, while knowledgeable of the fundamental value of their own company, 
are unable to infer whether the estimated synergies by the bidding company are a 
market effect, a sector effect, or a firm effect. In periods of high market valuations, 
merger activity can significantly increase if acquirors are able to pay higher prices, 
which is possible by issuing equity. This illustrates that in a hot market we expect 
takeover probabilities to be higher.
In Table 1 we present a summary of the four theoretical explanations of acquisitions 
and relate each theory to the firm characteristics discussed in the text.
The prediction of takeover targets has been an important area of the merger 
and acquisitions related research since the 1970s. The approach was derived from 
the one used in earlier research on predicting bankruptcies. (see Altman 1968, for 
further reference). The focus on the prediction of takeover targets was likely 
facilitated by the third merger wave that took place between 1965 and 1969. 
As pointed out by Jucunda (2014), the primary aim of 1970s studies was to find 
common financial characteristics shared among companies that became an object of 
a takeover.
Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) are the first researchers we are aware of who 
attempt to distinguish between acquired and non-acquired firms based on financial 
characteristics. Like Altman (1968) in bankruptcy prediction, they use discriminant 
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analysis, a method that is heavily dependent on the normality assumption of predictor 
variables. Substantial criticism of the 1970s studies was provided by Palepu (1986), 
who highlights that these studies suffered from several methodological flaws that led 
to biases in the estimationof failure probabilities and the estimation of the probabilities 
of firms being a target. Since 1980s, logistic regressions have become the dominant 
method used to predict takeover targets. The main reason is that logistic regression 
has much more relaxed assumptions, while the results are easier to interpret and more 
robust when underlying assumptions are violated (Eisenbeis 1975).
Many studies have focused on predicting takeover targets in recent years (e.g. 
Hasbrouck 1985; Shleifer and Vishny 2003; Rossi and Volpin 2004; Powell and 
Yawson 2005). Almost all studies focus on the UK (e.g. Powell 1997; Barnes 1998; 
Gaganis et al. 2009; Danbolt et al. 2016) or the US (e.g. Ambrose and Megginson 
1992; Walter 1994; Cudd and Duggal 2000). We are aware of one study for that 
examines multiple European countries (Brar et al. 2009). While alternative models, 
such as multiple discriminant analysis, Cox-regression and many others have been 
suggested, most studies follow Palepu’s (1986) logit model paired with the appropriate 
independent variables.
3  Concentration and Corporate Control in the Netherlands
The Netherlands has a small open economy and a long tradition of business activity 
including involvement in merger and acquisition activity (Van Zanden 1997; 
Sluyterman 2005). Therefore, global merger waves are likely to affect Dutch 
companies. Martynova and Renneboog (2008) review the literature on merger waves 
and discuss five waves, where the first so-called Great Merger Wave took place in 
the 1890s in the US. In the twentieth century the US witnessed a second merger 
wave in the 1920s, which extended into several European countries. Bouwens and 
Table 1  Theories and firm characteristics
Inefficient  
management
Resource mismatch 
and synergies
Undervaluation Sentiment
Firm size Negative Negative
Tangibility Positive
Depreciation Positive
Profitability Negative Positive
Market value Negative Positive Negative
Leverage Negative Positive
Cash Positive Negative
Hot market Positive
Takeover defenses Negative
Blockholders Negative
Financial shareholders Positive
Industrial shareholders Positive
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Dankers (2012, pp. 68–71) document that in the Netherlands many firms where 
involved in mergers. During this period, Dutch firms typically engaged in horizontal 
mergers for the purpose of improvingtheir competitive position.1 Already in this 
early merger wave Dutch firms were involved in international takeovers. The third 
global merger wave took off in the 1950s and peaked in the late 1960s (Martynova 
and Renneboog 2008). Many Dutch firms were involved in merger activities towards 
the end of the global wave, and again horizontal mergers were the dominant strategy. 
Although some firms also undertook diversifying acquisitions (Bouwens and 
Dankers 2012, pp. 174–175). For example, the sugar producer CSM diversified with 
acquisitions in packaging, seed trade, leisure and foods. Interestingly, towards the 
end of this wave in 1970 the Social-Economic Council (SER) established procedural 
rules for mergers, including information provisions for shareholders and employees.
In the 1960s and 1970s most Dutch firms were owned by large domestic 
shareholders, such as institutional investors and wealthy individuals or families. 
These shareholders coordinated with the firm managers and the supervisory board, 
as was common in the coordinated market economy system (Sluyterman 2005; 
Westerhuis and De Jong 2015). The Dutch corporate climate and law stimulated 
managers of large firms to act in the interest of all stakeholders. In practice, this 
provided the managers with a well-protected position against disciplinary takeovers. 
The firms often had priority shares, preference shares and certificates. The former 
puts specific decision-making power in the hands of a few individuals, often loyal 
to the management. Priority shares are typically in a foundation to preserve the 
continuity of the firm. Priority shares have the statutory right to hire and fire managers 
and supervisors, for example in case of poor performance (Voogd 1989). Certificates 
are non-voting shares issued by a trust or foundation, where the actual shares 
including the voting power would be held by this intermediary (Voogd 1989). In 
the early 1970s protective preference shares become popular, as these instruments 
protect against hostile takeovers. In case of a threat these shares are placed with 
a befriended foundation, diluting the stake of the hostile shareholders (Westerhuis 
and De Jong 2015). These three types of anti-takeover measures allowed firms to 
be shielded from the market for corporate control, which was consistent with the 
coordinated market economy of the 1960s and 1970s. In this respect, it is striking 
that in 1979 the first hostile takeover took place in the Netherlands, when Lantana 
Beheer took over the N.V. Tilburgse Waterleiding-Maatschappij (Nieuwe Leidsche 
Courant, November 3, 1979). The company had tried to implement an anti-takeover 
measure, but the shareholder voted against the use of takeover defenses.
The fourth global merger wave started in the 1980s, and many deals involved 
diversifying acquisitions that led to conglomerate firms. In the Netherlands, firms 
followed the international trend and the period of high economic growth led to many 
cross-border horizontal mergers. Then the fifth wave already starts in the 1990s 
and seems to be a continuation of the fourth wave, only interrupted by the 1987 
stock market crash. The 1990s witnessed many large firms merging (Martynova and 
1 Horizontal mergers, are mergers or consolidations that occur between firms that operate within the 
same industry and have similar operational characteristics.
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Renneboog 2008; Bouwens and Dankers 2012, pp. 230–232). In this period, national 
supervision became influenced by rules set by the European Commission, which 
aimed to limit mergers with negative effects on competition that would disadvantage 
consumers and yield disproportional market power to newly combined firms. In this 
period, we find the first takeover fights in the Netherlands. While hostile takeovers had 
not taken place after Lantana acquired the Tilburgsche Waterleiding-Maatschappij, 
in the 1980s Elsevier tried to acquire Kluwer in 1986 and Ahrend targeted 
Buhrmann-Tetterode in 1989 (Westerhuis and De Jong 2015, p. 182). Both attempts 
failed, because of the use of anti-takeover devices.
In conjunction with the fourth merger wave, the Dutch economy moved to 
a more liberal market, among others because of influences from the US and also 
the UK, which introduced shareholder wealth maximization as the new dominant 
paradigm (Sluyterman 2005; Westerhuis and De Jong 2015). The shareholder base 
also changed, as domestic institutional investors started to diversify globally, at 
expense of their domestic holdings. At the same time, foreign investors bought up 
Dutch shares. These investors typically increased their holdings in large multinational 
firms. Also, shareholder value was promoted because remuneration packages 
of top managers increasingly included bonus and option plans. As a result, the 
orientation of Dutch firms changed to enhance market value, with less attention to the 
value for other stakeholders. However, the takeover defences were not immediately 
abolished and many firms embraced shareholder value and remuneration packages, but 
did not want to give up all the voting rights to the shareholders (De Jong et al. 2005). 
Over a long transition period from the mid-1980s until the global financial crisis 
in 2007/2008, the landscape changed and takeover defences were slowly abolished 
or altered to give shareholders more influence (Westerhuis and De Jong 2015).
To conclude, in the entire period under investigation in the Dutch setting, the 
market for corporate control can be frustrated by firm top management that is 
unwilling to sell to an acquirer, when the acquirer makes an offer motivated by 
inefficiencies, synergies or undervaluation. With the help of takeover defences or 
by colluding with a large shareholder, the management that is under attack of a 
hostile takeover, can successfully deter the acquisition attempt. In other words, 
with takeover defences and large shareholders, the three sets of motives may not be 
actually observable in our data. It should be noted that this applies particularly 
to inefficiency and undervaluation, where the management is most likely to resist 
a takeover, because they are likely to be replaced by a new management team. 
Of course, it is very interesting to test the effects of takeover defences on the 
probability of a takeover, because this measures the effectiveness of the legal 
barriers. In case the defences reduce takeover probabilities, they are an effective 
device and can shield managers from the market for corporate control. The absence 
of an effect would be evidence of managers making their decisions independent of 
the pressure of the market for corporate control.
Previous research on mergers and acquisitions in the Netherlands has focused on 
the shareholder wealth effects upon the announcements of mergers and acquisitions. 
Van Frederikslust et al. (2000) investigate the period 1954–1997 and find that the 
101 mergers result in an 11.9% cumulative abnormal return for targets and 0.25% 
for acquirers. This implies that stock market participants expect synergies, but that 
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the target companies manage to capture the entire premium, on average. Corhay and 
Tourani Rad (2000) study takeovers of foreign firms by Dutch companies in the 1990s 
and find weak evidence that the announcement lead to positive abnormal returns. 
Finally, De Jong et  al. (2007) measure announcement effects of 865 acquisition 
announcements in the years 1993–2004 and conclude that the average effect is a 
positive 1.1% return for acquirers, but also find that the dispersion of outcomes is 
very large.
4  Data and Empirical Method
Our data comprises all Dutch companies listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange 
between 1961 and 2008 and mentioned in the Van Oss Effectenboek or the database 
of the Dutch institution for national statistics (Centraal Bureau van de Statistiek) on 
the one hand, and Gids bij de Officiële Prijscourant on the other hand. We require 
to have all data available for our variables. Our sample consists 574 unique firms, 
3224 observations, with 200 successful takeovers. As our aim is to predict takeovers 
throughout the period 1961–2008, we estimate various logistic regressions. Equation 1 
highlights our specification.
We define the left-hand-side variable, Loge
휋i,t(Takeover)
1−휋i,t(Takeover)
 , as the log odds ratio that 
firm’s will be a takeover target. Xi,t is a vector of explanatory variables.2 Additionally, 
our estimations include industry fixed effects ( 휙).3 Standard errors are clustered at the 
industry level. While we specify Eq.  (1) in terms of log odds, our tables with 
regression estimates report the average marginal effects, for simplicity and the ease of 
interpreting the effect size. We report z-statistics in parentheses and use conventional 
levels for significance testing. We distinguish in our estimation observations until and 
after 1985, in order to capture the shift in the Dutch economy from a coordinated 
market system to a more liberal system and the potential changes in the effects of 
anti-takeover measures (Sluyterman 2005; Westerhuis and De Jong 2015).
Our variables of interest are the following: Firm size is the natural logarithm 
of the firm’s total assets expressed in 2008 values and in guilders (the Dutch 
currency in the largest part of our period; in 2002 the guilder was replace by the euro 
at a rate of 2.20 guilders per euro). Tangibility is the ratio of the firms fixed assets 
to total assets. Depreciation is the total annual amount depreciated on the firm’s 
assets, scaled by total assets. Profitability is defined as the firm’s return on assets (i.e. 
earnings before interest over total assets). Market-to-book is the market value of the 
(1)Loge
휋i,t(Takeover)
1 − 휋i,t(Takeover)
= 훽1Xi,t + 휙
2 All relevant and continuous variables are winsorized at the 5% level (i.e. 2.5% on either end of the 
distribution).
3 In robustness tests we also include decade fixed effects to capture macroeconomic fluctuations not 
captured by our M&A market sentiment variable. We find that all our results are robust.
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firm’s equity to the book value of equity. Leverage is the firm’s total debt scaled by total 
assets. Cash is cash and bank holdings scaled by total assets. M&A market sentiment 
 is equal to 1 if a year ranks in the fourth quartile of merger and acquisition activity 
between 1961 and 2008. We assume that in years with strong positive sentiments and 
accommodating conditions for mergers and acquisitions, firms are more likely 
to be taken over. Because we aim to provide an extensive description of takeover 
probabilities, we want to control for these sentiments. However, because the 
sentiments are unobservable, we use the takeover activity from our sample, even 
though this a tautological definition. We expect the coefficient to by positive in all 
specification, in case takeovers are clustered in time.
The variable Number of takeover defences counts the number of total takeover 
defences in place for each firm at the end of the year, from a set of three defences. Based 
on Voogd (1989) we identify three prominent takeover defences (binary indicators); 
(1) the presences of anti-takeover preference shares; (2) the trading of certificates and; 
(3) the presence of priority shares.
We distinguish five main industries and add indicator variables for light industrial 
firms, heavy industrial firms, retail firms, transportation firms, and service firms. 
For our robustness analysis we define three additional variables. Average two-year 
growth is the change in total assets over the past 2  years. Two-year compounded 
growth rate is the two-year compounded growth of total assets. Investments is the 
change in fixed assets corrected for depreciation.
For a subsample (from 1992) we also have ownership information, identifying 
blockholders and their identity. Blockholders is a binary variable equal to one if and 
only if a shareholder is present owning more than 5 % of the firm’s share (including 
institutional shareholders). Additionally we have information on the percentage of 
shares held the following investors: (1) financial institutions (not pension fund or 
insurance company); (2) pension funds; (3) insurance companies; (4) industrials 
and; (5) private individuals.
5  Results
Before discussing the main results of our analysis, we highlight some of the 
characteristics of our sample. Table  2, Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of 
our sample composition. Our sample consists of 574 unique firms over the period 
1961–2008, which yields 3424 firm-year observations. Of these 574 firms, 372 firms 
have never received a takeover bid during the period, while 202 did receive an offer. 
The annual unconditional takeover probability is approximately 6% (i.e. 214 takeover 
bids out of 3424 observations). We find that takeover probabilities in our data set 
slightly increase after 1985. We have very few unsuccessful bids and in further 
analyses we omit these observations from the sample. That is, in our analysis, all takeover 
bids included represent M&A announcements that result in an actual merger or 
acquisition.
Table  2, Panel B shows the descriptive statistics for all variables employed in 
our analysis. We provide descriptive statistics for the full period, as well as for the 
periods 1961–1985 and 1986–2008. We find that firms in our sample become larger, 
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less profitable, and become more highly valued (relative to their book value) by 
investors after 1985. Moreover, firms employed more takeover defences after 1985. 
This finding is slightly counter-intuitive, because the shareholder revolution of the 
mid-1980s did make takeover defences less popular among investors. However, 
managers also have an incentive to protect themselves against more opportunistic 
and active shareholders and employed more takeover defences. Additionally we find 
that priority shares were used less after 1985, however preference and certificates are 
used more. Preference shares are only introduced in the early 1970s. Table 3 shows 
the comparison of target and non-target firms in the two periods we distinguish.
In the period from 1961 to 1985 we find that targets were predominantly firms 
with relatively low levels of fixed assets and low leverage. Additionally, target 
firms held approximately 1.3 times more cash than non-targets. With respect to 
takeover defences, target firms used significantly less priority shares. For the period 
1986–2008, target firms depreciated their assets more and were relatively small. We 
find that target firms used fewer takeover defences, primarily the used less priority 
shares than non-target firms. Overall, we find that the univariate statistics reveal 
that the determinants of firms’ likelihoods to be takeover candidates have significantly 
changed after the mid-1980s. More generally, in the first period 83% of the targets 
are acquired during an M&A market with positive sentiment, whereas for the 
second period only 52% of all acquisitions occur under these market conditions. We 
will provide more interpretation to these findings when examining multivariate logit 
models.
In Table 4 we present a series of logit models to predict whether a firm receives a 
takeover bid or not for the full period. Our staggered setup allows us to examine the 
different categories of variables important for corporate takeovers. We specify two 
baseline models and explain our results.
Table 4 column (7) shows our baseline results including the number of takeover 
defences. We find that firms that depreciate more, are less profitable, have more 
cash holdings and operate in a period with positive M&A sentiment, are more likely 
to be acquired. Firms that depreciate more, ready their balance sheet to reflect the 
true value of their assets, making them a more attractive takeover target. The result 
that less profitable firms are more likely to be targeted is consistent with an efficient 
market for corporate control, where poorly performing firms are taken over and 
restructured. Firms with more cash holdings have more financial flexibility and can 
provide coinsurance to potential acquirers (e.g. Shastri 1990; Billett et  al. 2004). 
Acquirers can take over a cash-rich firm can pay down their risky debt. Moreover, 
in times when merger and acquisition activity is high, takeover probabilities are 
3.4% higher. Additionally, we find that profitable firms are less likely to be acquired. 
Highly profitable firms are valued highly and are thus more expensive to acquire.
Consistent with the Dutch institutional arrangements, we find that firms with 
more takeover defences have significantly lower takeover probabilities. This 
implies that the legal barriers are effective in deterring takeovers. From the reported 
average marginal effects, we find that for each additional takeover defence in place, 
takeover probabilities decrease by approximately 90 basis points (bps). Column 
(8) sub-sequently, shows the same results, however we make a distinction between 
different takeover defences firms employed. We find that the negative effect of 
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Table 5  Logit model for sub periods
The z-values are in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted with *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 
1%. All variables are defined in the text
Variables (1) (2) (3a) (4a) (3b) (4b)
Baseline Baseline 1961–1985 1986–2008 1961–1985 1986–2008
Post 1985 (dummy) 0.010***
(2.655)
Firm size (mln, 2008 
guilders)
0.001 − 0.000 0.002 − 0.007 0.001 − 0.007
(0.684) (− 0.012) (1.043) (− 1.605) (0.684) (− 1.577)
Tangibility − 0.019 − 0.013 − 0.027 0.021 − 0.031 0.025
(− 1.584) (− 1.439) (− 1.576) (0.527) (− 1.551) (0.557)
Depreciation 0.152** 0.096* 0.107 0.154 0.127 0.174
(2.357) (1.925) (1.313) (0.932) (1.315) (0.908)
Profitability − 0.042* − 0.026 − 0.046 0.073 − 0.053 0.076
(− 1.951) (− 1.613) (− 1.423) (1.052) (− 1.420) (1.004)
Market-to-book 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 − 0.000 0.002
(0.716) (0.669) (0.027) (0.083) (− 0.016) (0.238)
Leverage − 0.018 − 0.015* − 0.021* 0.016 − 0.023* 0.017
(− 1.490) (− 1.690) (− 1.703) (0.366) (− 1.707) (0.358)
Cash 0.046** 0.021 0.073** − 0.044 0.084** − 0.044
(2.548) (1.296) (2.340) (− 0.620) (2.281) (− 0.567)
Hot M&A market 0.034*** 0.025*** 0.030*** 0.048*** 0.034*** 0.052***
(4.878) (4.007) (2.759) (3.346) (2.704) (2.807)
Number of takeover defenses − 0.009* − 0.009** − 0.004 − 0.052**
(− 1.917) (− 2.425) (− 1.038) (− 2.537)
Preference shares − 0.005 − 0.031**
(− 0.603) (− 2.204)
Certificates 0.002 − 0.024
(0.405) (− 1.332)
Priority shares − 0.003 − 0.039*
(− 0.779) (− 1.936)
Observations 3424 3424 2084 1340 2084 1340
No. of targets 200 200 113 87 113 87
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 7.62% 8.08% 12.80% 8.12% 13% 9%
ROC 72% 73% 78% 73% 78% 73%
Variance decomposition
Assets 7% 6% 8% 17% 7% 16%
Performance 8% 7% 8% 7% 8% 6%
Financing 8% 7% 18% 2% 18% 2%
Hot M&A market 65% 61% 56% 41% 54% 38%
Takeover defenses 6% 6% 2% 29% 6% 34%
Industry FE 7% 6% 8% 4% 7% 5%
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takeover defences is primarily driven by the existence of priority shares outstanding 
(− 140 bps).
To provide a deeper understanding of how corporate takeover probabilities changed 
as the Dutch economy transformed into a more liberal market economy during the 
mid-1980s, we split our sample period in the year until 1985 and from 1986 onwards, 
and we investigate the impact of this structural change. Table 5 shows the result of 
this analysis. Additionally, we report Shapely variance decomposition statistics, 
which allows us to assess the importance of each of the determinants in explaining the 
variance in takeover probabilities.4 Also, we report for each of our estimations the 
model’s ROC characteristics, assessing the predictive ability of our models (e.g. 
Taylor 2012; Colvin et al. 2015). Column (1) repeats our baseline model from Table 4. 
Column (2) then shows the inclusion of a simple binary indicator, which is equal 
to one after 1985. We find that takeover probabilities are 10% lower after 1985. In 
the remainder of our analysis we aim to explain these differences before and after 
1985. Columns (3) and (4) shows the estimation results when we estimate the model 
separately for each of the two sub-periods.
The effects in the two periods are statistically and economically significant for 
several variables and, most importantly, differ between these periods. During the 
early period 1961–1985, firms high on cash would be much more likely takeover 
candidates. That is, we find that if the average firm doubles the cash position, 
the probability of becoming a takeover target would increase by 34 basis points.5  
Similarly, firms with higher leverage were significantly less likely to be a target. 
We find that in case the average firm increases its leverage by one standard deviation 
its takeover probability would decrease by approximately 38 basis points. Most 
strikingly, takeover defences have no effect, after correcting for other factors. This finding 
is enforced by the relatively low Shapely value for takeover defences.6 In other words, 
the takeover defences are hardly relevant determinants of a takeover. Apparently, 
during the early period, strategic collaborations were negotiated behind closed doors 
without relevance of shareholder rights or pressure.
In the later period 1986–2008, we find significantly different results. For example, 
we find that the coefficients on firm size, tangibility, profitability, cash, hot market 
and takeover defences are significantly different from the previous period.7 We 
find that smaller firms, firms with more collateral, higher profitability and less 
5 The economic effects can be interpreted as follows. The average firm in our sample as a cash position 
of 4.67% (of total assets), doubling this cash position (keeping everything else equal), would increase the 
cash position by 4.67%. A one unit increase in would increase takeover probabilities by 730 basis points. 
Consequently a 4.67% increase results in a 34 basis point increase in takeover probabilities.
6 The intuition here is, that takeover defenses only add little value in contributing to the overall 
explanatory power of our model in the first period.
7 We compare coefficients between the different models using a Wald test.
4 While perhaps uncommon in economics, we report the decomposition of the explained variance of 
each of our estimations (e.g. Colvin et al. 2015). This procedure allows us to to explore how much power 
each category of variables have in explaining corporate failures. Combined with our sub-period analysis, 
this allows us to demonstrate the variability of takeover determinants.
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cash reserves are more likely to become takeover targets, compared to the previous 
period.
More important is that we find that in the recent period firms can successfully 
deter takeovers by having more defences, explaining as much as 29% of the variation. 
So, the acquisitions that do take place allow the predators to grow profitably, while 
firms—that want to stay independent or shield from disciplining—can successfully 
frustrate the market for corporate control. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 5 separate the 
effect of takeover defences. We find that after 1985 indeed takeover defences become 
more important and are effective across the board in deterring takeovers. Preference 
shares reduce takeover probabilities by approximately 3%, outstanding certificates 
reduce the chances of a takeover by 2.4% and priority shares reduce probabilities 
by approximately 4%. Moreover, we find that this division in type of takeover 
defences is in fact important, without the separation the Shapely explanatory 
power is only 29%, compared to 34% when including the different types.
While takeover defences might have become more important after 1985, this 
effect might very well be driven by changes in corporate ownership structure. To 
this end, we collect information on blockholders (i.e. shareholders, holding more 
than 5% of the shares of a firm). In Table 6 we consider the most recent period and 
add these ownership variables, which data is only available after 1992. We discuss 
our results for the period 1992–2008.
We find that when we include ownership and blockholder information into 
our analysis, all our previous results hold. Column (2) shows that ownership 
(i.e. the presence of a blockholder) does not matter for takeover probabilities. In the 
subsequent columns, we include information on the percentage of shares held by 
different blockholders and whether these blockholders maintain a controlling interest 
in the firm (> 50% of the shares).8 We find that the presence of financial institutions 
increases the probability of takeovers as they are primarily interested in 
capturing returns upon announcement of takeovers. We also find that industrials 
(i.e. non-financial corporations) increase the takeover probabilities. This finding 
illustrates the importance of so called toe-holds, as their stake (over 5%) is most 
likely to acquire the company in the future. Ultimately we find that blockholders and 
takeover defences account for approximately 45% of the explained variance in takeover 
probabilities. We conclude that takeover defences indeed lower the probability of a 
successful takeover and that the presence of different shareholders is important in 
this context.
We conclude with a set of robustness tests, reported in Table 7. In column (1) 
we include decade fixed effects, column (2) includes a variable to capture corporate 
asset growth, column (4) includes investments (i.e. changes in fixed assets in place) 
and column (5) includes only those firms with a minimum of four observations per 
firm. We find in Table 7 that all our primary results hold.
8 We test additional cut-off points for the presence of a blockholder and find no different effects. As 
such, we focus on the presence of a blockholder with controlling interest. We thank an anonymous 
referee for this suggestion.
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6  Conclusion
This paper investigates the determinants of takeover probabilities in the Dutch 
economy. We document a significant shift in the logic of the Dutch market for 
corporate control in the wake of the shareholder revolution of the mid-1980s. 
Overall, we conclude that the change from a coordinated and cooperative market 
economy to a more liberal system where shareholder value maximization became 
Table 7  Robustness analysis
The z-values are in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted with *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 
10%. All variables are defined in the text
Variables (1) (3) (4) (5)
Decade FE Asset growth Investments Minimum of four 
observations for each 
firm
Post 1985 (dummy) 0.029 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.006**
(1.626) (2.656) (2.843) (2.213)
Firm size (mln, 2008 guilders) 0.000 0.000 0.000 − 0.000
(0.205) (0.012) (0.058) (− 0.510)
Tangibility − 0.019 − 0.013 − 0.017* − 0.008
(− 1.565) (− 1.433) (− 1.680) (− 1.216)
Depreciation 0.134* 0.096* 0.096* 0.074*
(1.923) (1.911) (1.874) (1.904)
Profitability − 0.040* − 0.026 − 0.023 − 0.020
(− 1.764) (− 1.609) (− 1.452) (− 1.533)
Market-to-book 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.554) (0.674) (0.861) (1.400)
Leverage − 0.019* − 0.015* − 0.017* − 0.012*
(− 1.718) (− 1.690) (− 1.781) (− 1.699)
Cash 0.029 0.021 0.015 0.014
(1.289) (1.293) (0.928) (1.190)
Hot M&A market 0.029*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.016***
(4.027) (3.998) (3.873) (3.227)
Number of takeover defenses − 0.011** − 0.009** − 0.009** − 0.007**
(− 2.369) (− 2.418) (− 2.391) (− 2.521)
2 year compounded growth rate − 0.000
(− 0.118)
Investments (including depreciation) − 0.000
(− 0.204)
Observations 3424 3422 3369 3142
No. of targets 200 200 193 130
Decade FE Yes No No No
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 8% 8% 8% 9%
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the first priority significantly affected the market for corporate control. Not 
only did the determinants of successful takeover targets change, but so did the 
importance of legal takeover defences.
Prior to the mid-1980s, takeover targets were characterized as flushed 
with cash and operating with low leverage. That is, the focus of acquirors was 
primarily on target companies that were inefficiently managed or fit with the acquiror’s 
growth and resource strategies. We find that in this era takeover defences 
were not relevant, probably because in this cooperative system, the main stake 
holders would maintain good relations with each other, without seeking disciplinary 
 measures, such as hostile takeovers. It is interesting that acquisitions may have 
served to improve efficiency, without the pressure from the market for corporate 
control. Obviously, this is a conjecture, because further research would have to 
prove that the actual efficiency after the acquisition has improved.
In the wake of the shareholder revolution, driven by developments in the US 
and UK, the Dutch market for corporate control changed significantly. More 
explicitly, after 1985 takeover probabilities increased by approximately 10%. 
Moreover, after 1985 the determinants of takeover probabilities have changed. 
We find that in this period small and profitable companies were primarily the 
focus of acquirors. We conclude, that during this period firms with insufficient 
resources to growth could opt for a takeover by a larger and cash-rich firm to 
continue growth. Firms were also able to frustrate the market for corporate 
control by using takeover defences. Takeover defences became approximately 5 
times more important in determining takeover probabilities as the Dutch economy 
moved from a stakeholder based approach to a system where shareholder value 
maximization was the main objective. Our analysis is robust to the inclusion of 
ownership structure of Dutch corporations, this analysis harbours some interesting 
conclusions. We find that the presence of blockholders did not determine 
the takeover probabilities, it was the identity or the type of blockholders that 
matter. We conclude that after 1985, managers were able to frustrate the market for 
corporate control by employing takeover defences or finding institutional shareholders 
(pension funds) at their side.
Overall, this paper is the first to study the Dutch takeover market. By employing 
a unique data set we are able to analyse the determinants of takeover probability, 
their relevance in two distinct periods and draw conclusions on the determinants 
of successful Dutch takeovers. More importantly, this paper sheds light on the 
efficacy of takeover defences. We shed a light on the heated debates on the 
relevance of takeover defences in the Dutch corporate landscape. Takeover 
defences are relevant, economically important and indeed successful in deterring 
unwanted or unsolicited takeover bids.
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